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Content regulation1 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Par
services, in particular electronic commerce,
2 In this regard, M. Peguera Poch, ‘La exenc
dt/20080/index.html).
3 For a more refined comparison of the two
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This study considers the scope of the injunction a court may issue against an intermediary
service provider with a view to preventing or terminating an infringement, particularly of an
intellectual property right. Thematter is studied in the light of the aim sharedby the European
Union and the Council of Europe to promote freedom of expression via communication
networks. Despite technological progress and the emergence of software that are increasingly
precise and ever better controlled in terms of their effects, implementation of a filtering
measure appears difficult to reconcile with the right to freedom of expression. Consequently,
the problematic comes down to this question: howdowedo enoughwithout doing toomuch?
ª 2011 Etienne Montero and Quentin Van Enis. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.1. Introduction a matter of establishing a ‘balance between the differentIt is not always simple to identify the authors of illegal or
harmful content in an open digital environment, global in
scale, where it is easy to operate from abroad and/or anony-
mously. On the other hand, intermediary providers involved
in transmitting or storing the disputed content are known and
clearly identified, close to the victim and generally solvent. It
is therefore understandable that they have naturally become
the preferred target of liability actions.
Thus the question of the liability of technical intermedi-
aries with regard to illegal content transmitted or hosted by
them has rapidly become a major issue when drawing up
a legal framework for the information society. It is clear that
one of the main objectives of the Directive on electronic
commerce1 was precisely to establish a system of exemption
from liability for some Internet intermediary services.2 It wasliament and of the Coun
in the Internal Market (D
ión de responsabilidad civ
systems, E. Montero and
art), Book 26b, vol. 3, Bru
ring E.U. and U.S. Legal F
s le Digital Millennium C
e l’informatique et des rése
ne Montero and Quentininterests at stake’ (recital 41). Like the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act on which it draws,3 the system of liability
prescribed in Section 4 achieves a compromise between the
interests of providers of Internet intermediary services and
those of the content industry (creators and holders of rights to
software, music, video, film, etc.).
A dual statement lies at the heart of this compromise. On
the one hand, intermediary providers - confined to a purely
technical role - are not supposed to acquaint themselves with
the content they store or transmit; on the other hand, it is
quite obvious that they are ideally placed and best equipped
to prevent or terminate illegal practices committed via their
services.
Hence the subtle arrangements put in place. On the one
hand, exemptions from liability, based on conditions, are
introduced for certain intermediary activities: transmission ofcil of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society
irective on electronic commerce), OJEC, L 178 of 17 July 2000, p. 1.
il por contenidos ajenos en Internet’ 2001, p. 1 (www.uoc.edu/in3/
H. Jacquemin, ‘La responsabilité civile des médias’, Responsabilités -
ssels, Kluwer, 2004, Issue 189 et seq., p. 18 et seq.; R. Julia-Barcelo,
ramework’, EIPR, 2000, pp. 106e119; V. Sedallian, ‘La responsabilité
opyright Act américain et le projet de directive européenne sur le
aux, Issue 110, 1999, pp. 1e4.
Van Enis. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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to such a network, storage of data in the form of a temporary
copy (‘cache’) and hosting4; in addition, no general obligation
may be imposed on these intermediary providers to monitor
and supervise the content they transmit or store, nor any
obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating
illegal activity.5 On the other hand, they are required to work
with the judicial and police authorities by keeping them
informed of alleged illegal activities carried out by recipients of
their services or communicating to them the data identifying
these recipients6; a court may impose a temporary monitoring
obligation on them in a particular instance7 and an injunction
is always possible, ordering a provider to prevent or terminate
an infringement8; lastly, if alerted, providers of hosting and
cache-copy services are also required to act expeditiously to
remove the illegal content or disable access to it.9
Thus by shielding the intermediary providers from liability
actions and not requiring them to undertake supervision and to
track infringements themselves, the European legislator
intended not just to encourage the boom in information society
services but also to promote freedom of expression. In fact, if
theyweremore exposed, theywould be less inclined to develop
potentially risky services such as those designed to receive
content of all kinds supplied by Internet users. Undoubtedly,
fewer community and participation sites would have emerged
and flourished, including social networks (such as Facebook),
wikis (such asWikipedia) and blogs, content-sharing sites (such
as YouTube and Dailymotion) or electronic marketplaces (such
as eBay). Moreover, intermediary providers are spared the
heavy costs linked to supervision and filtering10 - technically
difficult to implement, of dubious effectiveness and involving
significant cost - and all forms of prior censorship are avoided.
At the same time, it has been said, the interests of users
and third parties are also taken into account since they are, in
particular, at liberty to ask a court to order an intermediary to
prevent or terminate an infringement. This possibility,4 Articles 12 to 14 of the Directive on electronic commerce.
5 Article 15(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce.
6 Article 15(2) of the Directive on electronic commerce.
7 Recital 47 of the Directive on electronic commerce.
8 Cf. Articles 12(3), 13(2) and 14(3), as well as recital 45, of the
Directive on electronic commerce.
9 Articles 13(1)(e) and 14(1)(b) of the Directive on electronic
commerce.
10 Filtering devices are ‘content-control software applications
designed to automatically block the display or downloading of
selected material on a web browser or other Internet application’
(C. Angelopoulos, ‘Filtering the Internet for Copyrighted Content
in Europe’, Iris plus, 2009-4, p. 2 and the reference to COUNCIL OF
EUROPE ‘Report by the Group of Specialists on Human Rights in
the information society (MC-S-IS) on the use and impact of
technical filtering measures for various types of content in the
online environment’ CM(2008)37, available atwww.tinyurl.com/
adyzoz).
11 Cf. Article 8(3) and recital 59 of Directive 2001/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights
in the information society, OJEC, L 167 of 22 June 2001, p. 10, as
well as Article 11 and recitals 22 and 23 of Directive 2004/48/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJEU, L 195 of 2
June 2004, p. 16.provided for by Directive 2000/31, has been confirmed in
subsequent directives.11
Case-law of recent years has indicated two main difficul-
ties in interpreting the measure:
- the first relates to the advent of Web 2.0 services and
whether the provider of such services may enjoy the
exemption from liability prescribed for hosting activity12;
- the second concerns the scope of the injunction a court may
issue against an intermediary with a view to preventing or
terminating an infringement, particularly of an intellectual
property right.
Only the latter question will be considered within this
study.
In order to correctly interpret the provisions relating to
liability of intermediaries, it is worth looking at the bigger
picture and locating them within the legal framework
common to the European Union and the Council of Europe. In
fact, a shared desire may be seen on the part of the European
Community and the ’Europe of Human Rights’ to promote, via
development of information technologies and communica-
tion networks, the information society and, more broadly,
freedom of expression (I).
This objective of promoting freedom of expression is key to
interpretation when determining the scope of injunctions
liable to be issued against Internet intermediary providers (II).2. Information society intermediaries,
a medium for freedom of expression in the
European legal order
Internet intermediaries play a cardinal role in promoting
freedom of expression via communication networks. In this
regard, the degree of concern on the part of the Council of
Europe and the European Union to protect technical providers
(A) is worthy of note. A close reading of Strasbourg case-law
and the work of the Council of Europe confirms that they are
clearly among the beneficiaries of the freedom of expression
enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (B).2.1. Convergence of concerns within the two Europes
Since the end of the 1990s both EuropeanUnion and Council of
Europe bodies have promoted the information society. This
convergence of concerns is an excellent illustration of the
dialogue established, many years ago from now, between the
European Community and the Europe of Human Rights.
The two Europes are known to respond to one another on
many issues. This phenomenon should be reinforced by the12 On this question, see E. Montero, ‘Les responsabilités liées au
Web 2.0’, RDTI, Issue 32, 2008, pp. 361e386; A. Saint Martin,
‘Proposition d’une “responsabilité raisonnable” pour le Web 2.0’,
RLDI, 2007/32, No 1070, pp. 32e39; G. Teissonniere, ‘Quelle
responsabilité appliquer aux plates-formes de commerce en ligne
et autres intermédiaires de contenus?’, RLDI, 2008/35, No 1165, pp.
21e25.
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December 2009 and gives binding force to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union,13 and by the
scheduled accession of the latter to the European Convention
on Human Rights.14
The Court of Justice of the European Union, with a view to
reassuring some national constitutional courts that had
shown resistance to applying Community law, has long
considered itself competent to ensure respect, under general
principles of European Union law, for fundamental rights as
these result from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and as guaranteed by the international
instruments to which the Member States are party, among
which the European Convention on Human Rights receives
particular attention.
On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights,
led to supervise conformity with the Convention of certain
measures adopted by States when executing obligations
imposed by European Union law, has considered that transfer
of competences to an international organisation cannot
release a State from its responsibilities with regard to the
Convention.15 Questionably, the Court acknowledged that,
when a State had no discretion in applying Community law,
its supervision had to be exercised with a degree of reserve.16
In such circumstances the Court will presume a State’s
compliance with the obligations incumbent on it under the
Convention if the protection of fundamental rights provided
by the international organisation may be held to be ‘equiva-
lent’ to that provided by themechanism of the Convention, as
seems to be the case in the context of the European
Community.
Drafting of the Directive on electronic commerce perfectly
reflected this trend towards mutual dialogue between the two
Europes by making explicit reference, in its seventh recital, to13 Article 11 of the Charter protects freedom of expression and
information in the following way: ‘1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be
respected.’ The wording used is more condensed than that of
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Article
52 of the Treaty of Lisbon states, however, that ‘insofar as this
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be
the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive
protection.’ For a commentary, see E. Bribosia and O. De Schutter,
‘La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne’, JT,
2001, pp. 281e293, specifically pp. 284e285.
14 See Article 6(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that ‘The
Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (.). See E. Bribosia
and O. De Schutter, op. cit., pp. 288e289.
15 See ECtHR judgment in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret
Anonim Sirketi v Ireland of 30 June 2005, paragraphs 155e157. See
also ECtHR judgment in Matthews v United Kingdom of 18 February
1999, paragraph 34.
16 See S. Adam and F. Krenc, ‘La responsabilité des Etats mem-
bres de l’Union européenne devant la Cour européenne des droits
de l’homme’, JT, 2006, p. 87, paragraph 3.2.freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.2.2. Internet intermediaries and Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights
2.2.1. The role of intermediaries and freedom of expression
Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers (.)’. The second
paragraph of the same Article 10 adds that ‘the exercise of
these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsi-
bilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary’.
Applying the guarantees under Article 10 to the digital
universe does not appear to raise any obstacle of principle.17
In this regard, a Declaration of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe expressly states that: ‘Freedom of
expression, information and communication should be
respected in a digital as well as in a non-digital environment,
and should not be subject to restrictions other than those
provided for in Article 10 of the ECHR, simply because
communication is carried in digital form’.18
Quite to the contrary, the Internet, more than any other
communication medium, harbours the possibility of
a genuine ‘public discussion space’, the importance of which
to the democratic project is well-known.19
The Committee of Ministers expresses itself thus in
a recommendation to Member States: ‘The development of
information and communication technologies and services
should contribute to everyone’s enjoyment of the rights guar-
anteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, for the benefit of each individual and the democratic
culture of every society’.20
It isunquestionable, in thedawnof the 21stCentury, that the
net appears an essential medium for freedom of expression.17 See, in particular, P.-F. Docquir, ‘Contrôle des contenus sur
Internet et liberté d’expression au sens de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme’, CDPK, 2002, p. 174, Issue 1.
18 Declaration on Human Rights and the rule of law in the
Information Society adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13
May 2005 at the 926th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, avail-
able at sitewww.coe.int.
19 See, in particular, the thesis, not yet published, by P.-F. Doc-
quir, La liberté d’expression dans le réseau mondial de communication :
propositions pour une théorie du droit d’accès à l’espace public privatisé,
2009.
20 Declaration on Human Rights and the rule of law in the
Information Society adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13
May 2005 at the 926th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, avail-
able at sitewww.coe.int.
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infringement of freedom of expression via the Internet, the
Strasbourg SupremeCourt did not elaborate at all - as if it were
obvious - concerning applicability of the guarantees under
Article 10 to the Internet.21
As is well-known, the activity of intermediaries is essential
to enable all to express themselves on the Web.
A progressive reading of the judgments delivered by the
European Court of Human Rights in the field of Article 10 of
the Convention should logically lead to an acknowledgement
of the importance of technical intermediaries for freedom of
expression.
In fact, the Court has, on many occasions, emphasised,
with regard to publishers that, in supplying authors with
amedium, they participate fully in freedom of expression and
thus enjoy the guarantees offered by Article 10 of the
Convention.22
What is more, in a case concerning measures adopted by
the Swiss State obstructing parabolic antenna reception of
televised broadcasts transmitted via a Russian satellite, the
Court affirmed that Article 10 protects both the content of
information and the means of transmitting and receiving it, ‘since
any restriction imposed on the means necessarily interferes
with the right to receive and impart information’.23
Currently, digital media play a leading role among the
‘means of transmitting and receiving information’ and use of
network intermediaries is a necessity for all those wishing to
express themselves on the Web. Protecting intermediaries is
therefore, at the same time, protecting freedom of expression.
2.2.2. Content protected by freedom of expression
Since the arrangements for exempting intermediaries that
were put in place by the Directive on electronic commerce
are based on the dual objective of encouraging electronic
commerce and promoting freedom of expression, it seems
worth recalling that the European Court of Human Rights21 ECtHR judgment in Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v United
Kingdom of 10 March 2009, RDTI, issue 37, 2009, p. 87 and
commentary by Q. Van Enis (‘Le temps ne fait rien à l’affaire. Les
archives Internet du Times devant la Cour européenne des droits
de l’homme’).
22 The analogy with technical intermediaries stops there since,
in the absence of editorial work to select content, there can be no
question of making them share the ‘duties and responsibilities’
incumbent on authors.
23 ECtHR judgment in Autronic AG v Switzerland of 22 May 1990,
paragraph 47. In a recent case the Court recalled that Article 10
applies to judicial decisions preventing a person from receiving
information by satellite, ECtHR judgment in Khurshid Mustafa and
Tarzibachi v Sweden of 16 December 2008, paragraph 32.
24 See, in particular, ECtHR judgment in Barthold v Germany of 25
March 1985, paragraph 42. (In this case the Court, unable to
distinguish between what counted as information and what
counted as advertising, concluded that Article 10 was applicable
‘without needing to inquire in the present case whether or not
advertising as such comes within the scope of the guarantee
under this provision’); ECtHR judgment in Markt Intern Verlag
GmbH and Klaus Beermann v Germany of 20 November 1989, para-
graph 26 (information of a commercial nature ‘cannot be
excluded from the scope of Article 10 x 1 which does not apply
solely to certain types of information or ideas or forms of
expression’).has expressly acknowledged that commercial speech is
indeed classed as content protected by freedom of
expression.24
The Strasbourg Court emphasised in this regard that
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees freedomof expression
to ‘everyone’, without making a distinction according to
whether the type of aim pursued is profit-making or not.25
Thus, not just online publicity but also, for example, sales
advertisements displayed in electronic marketplaces
unquestionably come under content covered by Article 10 of
the Convention.
2.2.3. Supervision of permissible restrictions
Interference in the right to freedom of expression may be
directly the act of the State but may also result from its
inability to provide persons under its jurisdiction with effec-
tive use of this right. In other words, under their positive
obligations, States must take all reasonably proper measures
to prevent freedom of expression being infringed.
Recalling the crucial importance of freedom of expression
for democracy, the Court has affirmed that ‘genuine, effective
exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the
State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive
measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations
between individuals’.26
Transposed to the digital universe, this message should
compel States to adopt a genuinely reassuring framework for
intermediaries in order to avoid the private censorship they
are liable to effect through fear of liability action.
In order to be permissible in terms of the Convention, any
interference in the right to freedom of expression must meet
the three cumulative conditions under the second paragraph
of Article 10.
The first condition, that of legality, means that the State
should state, clearly and precisely, in a norm accessible to all,
those situations in which a restriction might apply so that
individuals are able to determine, with an adequate level of
foreseeability, the potential consequences of behaving in
a particular way.27
In order to meet the second condition, that of legitimacy,
the restrictionmust pursue one of the legitimate objectives set
out, restrictively, in the second paragraph of Article 10.
In the context of this study the objective that consists in
protecting the reputation or the rights of others is of very
particular significance.
In fact, injunctions, the scope of which will be analysed in
the second part of this study, seek both to protect the honour
and the private life of persons on the Web and to banish
certain illegal content from it, in particular to ensure respect
for intellectual property rights to a work.
As is often the case, a balance should therefore be struck
between the interests involved. In this regard, in order tomeet25 See ECtHR judgment in Casado Coca v Spain of 24 February
1994, paragraph 35.
26 ECtHR judgment in Özgür Gündem v Turkey of 16 March 2000,
paragraph 43. See also EctHR judgment in Appleby and others v
United Kingdom of 6 May 2003, paragraphs 39e40.
27 See, in particular, ECtHR judgment in Sunday Times v United
Kingdom of 26 April 1979, paragraph 49; ECtHR judgment in Ste-
fanec v The Czech Republic of 18 July 2006, paragraph 41.
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restriction must respond to a ‘pressing social need’ and be
justified by ‘relevant and sufficient reasons’.28
It is interesting to note in this regard that the Strasbourg
Supreme Court considers that intellectual property rights come
within the scope of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to
the Convention, which enshrines the right to property.29
Indeed, according to the Court, when the ‘rights and free-
doms of others’, protection of which is seen as a legitimate
objective, ‘are themselves among those guaranteed by the
Conventionor its Protocols, itmustbeaccepted that theneedto
protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or free-
doms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this
constant search for a balance between the fundamental rights
of each individual which constitute the foundation of
a “democratic society”. The balancing of individual interests
that may well be contradictory is a difficult matter, and Con-
tracting States must have a broad margin of appreciation in
this respect, since the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the EuropeanCourt to assesswhether or not
there is a “pressing social need” capable of justifying interfer-
ence with one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention’.30
Such balancing of freedoms concurrently enshrined by the
Convention or by its Protocols must also be effected between
the right to freedomof expressionand the right to protectionof
private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.31
2.2.4. The work of the Council of Europe as an interpretative
background to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human
Rights
It is worth giving particular attention to the various texts,
declarations and recommendations that have been adopted
within the framework of the Council of Europe and greatly
advance the objective of promoting freedom of expression in
establishing a genuine information society.28 The case-law of the Court is settled in this regard. See, in
particular, ECtHR judgment in Sunday Times v United Kingdom, cited
above, paragraph 50. It seemsworth recalling that according to the
European Court of Human Rights, while prior restraints on publi-
cation are not, as such, prohibited by article 10 of the Convention,
they call for themost careful scrutiny on the part of the Court. See,
amongst others, ECtHR judgment in Observer and v United
Kingdom of 26 November 1991, paragraph 60; ECtHR judgment in
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (n2) of 26 November 1991,
paragraph 51; and, evenmore recently, ECtHR judgement in Ürper
and others v Turkey of 20 October 2009, paragraph 39.
29 See EctHR (GC) judgment in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v Portugal of 11
January 2007, paragraphs 66 to 72, and, evenmore recently, ECtHR
judgment in Balan v Moldova of 29 January 2008, paragraph 34.
30 ECtHR judgment in Chassagnou v France of 29 April 1999,
paragraph 113.
31 See ECtHR judgment in Von Hannover v Germany of 24 June
2004, paragraph 58.
32 Recommendation Rec(2001)8 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on self-regulation concerning cyber content (cited
above), for example, expressly states that ‘anyRecommendationof
the Committee of Ministers is an instrument of political commit-
ment, and not a legally enforceable instrument. Through its
adoption by the Committee ofMinisters, it binds allMember States
and does not require an individual adhesion by Member States’.While this clearly concerns soft law, known a priori not to
have any binding force,32 the importance of these texts should
still not be underestimated.
In fact, the European Court of Human Rights, when
needing to interpret the Convention, no longer has any hesi-
tation in drawing on them, which gives them genuine indirect
binding force.33
According to the Court itself, it is its duty, when defining
the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Conven-
tion, to ‘take into account elements of international law other
than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by
competent organs, and the practice of European States
reflecting their common values. The consensus emerging
from specialized international instruments and from the
practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant
consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions
of the Convention in specific cases. In this context, it is not
necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire
collection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the
precise subject matter of the case concerned. It will be suffi-
cient for the Court that the relevant international instruments
denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles
applied in international law or in the domestic law of the
majority of Member States of the Council of Europe and show,
in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern
societies’.34
This consideration should be kept in mind in order to
properly appreciate the various texts referred to.
As early as 1999, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe, in its Declaration on a European Policy for New
Information Technologies,35 called on the Member States to
‘encourage the free flow of information, opinions and ideas
through the use of the new information technologies’ and to
‘ensure respect for Human Rights and human dignity, notably
freedom of expression (.)’.
Two years later, the same Committee of Ministers adopted
a Recommendation to Member States on self-regulation con-
cerning cyber content.36
The objective pursued by this text is evident from its
recitals: it concerns protecting the freedom of expression of33 See, in particular, ECtHR (GC) judgment in Demir and Baykara v
Turkey of 12 November 2008, paragraph 74. For a critical analysis
see, in particular, F. Tulkens and S. Van drooghenbroeck, ‘Le soft
law des droits de l’Homme est-il vraiment si soft? Les dével-
oppements de la pratique interprétative récente de la Cour
européenne des droits de l’Homme’ in Liber amicorum Michel
Mahieu, Brussels, Larcier, 2008, pp. 505e526.
34 ECtHR (GC) judgment in Demir and Baykara v Turkey, cited
above, paragraphs 85e86.
35 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on a European Policy for New Information Technologies,
adopted on 7 May 1999 at its 104th meeting, available at sitewww.
coe.int.
36 Recommendation Rec(2001)8 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on self-regulation concerning cyber content (self-
regulation and user protection against illegal or harmful content
on new communications and information services), adopted on 5
September 2001 at the 762nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies,
available at sitewww.coe.int.
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or harmful content on the Internet.37
In order for freedom of expression to be respected fully,
filtering systems should therefore give users the opportunity
‘to make qualified choices about the type of lawful content
they wish to access, as for example parents or other persons
or institutions having responsibility over children as to what
content should be accessible to these children’.
Three years after adoption of the Directive on electronic
commerce within the European Community, the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Declaration
on freedom of communication on the Internet.38
In an interplay of cross-referencing, the Declaration recalls
both thecommitmentofMemberStatesof theCouncilof Europe
in relation to the fundamental right to freedom of expression
and information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the adoption of the
Community Directive of 8 June 2000 by some of these States.
TheDeclaration includes a sixth principle,which enshrines
the limited liability of service providers for Internet content.
In general terms, this principle stipulates that ‘Member
States should not impose on service providers a general obli-
gation to monitor content on the Internet to which they give
access, that they transmit or store, nor that of actively seeking
facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity’.
With regard to host providers, this principle is formulated
in the following way: ‘In cases where (.) service providers (.)
store content emanating from other parties, Member States
may hold them co-responsible if they do not act expeditiously
to remove or disable access to information or services as soon
as they become aware, as defined by national law, of their
illegal nature or, in the event of a claim for damages, of facts or
circumstances revealing the illegality of the activity or infor-
mation. When defining under national law the obligations of
service providers as set out in the previous paragraph, due
care must be taken to respect the freedom of expression of
thosewhomade the information available in the first place, as
well as the corresponding right of users to the information’.
In the Explanatory Note to the Declaration, it is further spec-
ified that: ‘in the case of hosting content emanating from third37 ‘Recalling the commitment of the Member States to the
fundamental right to freedom of expression and information as
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and to entrusting the
supervision of its application to the European Court of Human
Rights; Reaffirming that freedom of expression and information is
necessary for the social, economic, cultural and political devel-
opment of every human being, and constitutes a condition for the
harmonious progress of social and cultural groups, nations and
the international community, as expressed in its Declaration on
the Freedom of Expression and Information of 1982; Stressing
that the continued development of new communications and
information services should serve to further the right of
everyone, regardless of frontiers, to express, seek, receive and
impart information and ideas for the benefit of every individual
and the democratic culture of any society (.)’.
38 Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003 at the
840th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, available at site www.
coe.int.parties, intermediaries should in general not be held liable’. The
text expressly refers to Article 14 of Directive 2000/31.
It is then specified that ‘this does not apply (.) when the
third party is acting under the control of the intermediary, for
example when a newspaper company has its own server to
host content produced by its journalists. However, if the host
becomes aware of the illegal nature of the content on its
servers or, in the event of a claim for damages, of facts
revealing an illegal activity, it may reasonably be held liable.
The precise conditions should be laid down in national law
(.). It is to be expected that Member States will define inmore
detail what level of knowledge is required of service providers
before they become liable. In this respect, so-called “notice
and take down” procedures are very important. Member
States should, however, exercise caution imposing liability on
service providers for not reacting to such a notice. Questions
about whether certainmaterial is illegal are often complicated
and best dealt with by the courts. If service providers act too
quickly to remove content after a complaint is received, this
might be dangerous from the point of view of freedom of
expression and information. Perfectly legitimate content
might thus be suppressed out of fear of legal liability’.
In 2005, by means of the Declaration on Human Rights and
the rule of law in the Information Society,39 theMember States
of the Council of Europe undertook ‘to adopt policies for the
further development of the Information Society which are
compliant with the ECHR and the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights, and which aim to preserve, and
whenever possible enhance, democracy, to protect Human
Rights, in particular freedom of expression and information,
and to promote respect for the rule of law’.
In the Recommendation on promoting freedom of expres-
sion and information in the new information and communi-
cations environment,40 adopted on 26 September 2007, the
Committee ofMinisters ‘recommends that the governments of
Member States take all necessarymeasures to promote the full
exercise and enjoyment of Human Rights and fundamental
freedoms in the new information and communications envi-
ronment, in particular the right to freedom of expression and
informationpursuant toArticle 10of theECHRand the relevant
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (.)’.
Lastly, in the Recommendation to Member States on
measures to promote the respect for freedomof expression and
information with regard to Internet filters,41 the Committee of
Ministers, ‘aware that any intervention by Member States that39 Declaration on Human Rights and the rule of law in the
Information Society, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on
13 May 2005 at the 926th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies,
available at sitewww.coe.int.
40 Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)11 of the Committee of
Ministers on promoting freedom of expression and information
in the new information and communications environment,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 September 2007 at
the 1005th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, available at site
www.coe.int.
41 Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Minis-
ters to Member States on measures to promote the respect for
freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet
filters, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 March 2008
at the 1022nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, available at site
www.coe.int.
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a restriction on freedom of expression and access to informa-
tion in theonlineenvironmentand that sucha restrictionwould
have to fulfil the conditions in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights’, urges theMember
States to ‘guarantee that nationwide general blocking or
filtering measures are only introduced by the state if the
conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights are fulfilled. Such action by the state
shouldonly be taken if thefiltering concerns specificand clearly
identifiable content, a competent national authority has taken
adecisionon its illegalityand thedecisioncanbereviewedbyan
independent and impartial tribunal or regulatory body, in
accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights’.45 Last paragraph of Principle 6.
46 Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society,
OJEC, L 167 of 22 June 2001, p. 10. Emphasis added. See also recital
59 of the Directive.
47 In the internationally recognised sense of the expression, i.e.
including what we call industrial property (notably trade mark
rights).
48 Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, OJEC, L 195 of 2 June 2004, p.16. Emphasis
added. See also recitals 22 and 23 of the Directive.
49 Transposition of Directive 2004/48 into Belgian law required
adaptation of the Law of 30 June 1994 on copyright and related
rights (MB, 27 July 1994, p. 19297), Article 87(1) of which now reads
as follows: ‘The president of the court of first instance and the
president of the commercial court, in the matters under the
respective jurisdiction of these courts, shall establish the exis-
tence and order the termination of any infringement of a copy-
right or related right. They may also issue an injunction against
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to3. The scope of injunctions
It follows from the foregoing that the European Community
and the Europe of Human Rights come together in a common
desire to promote information society services and, more
broadly, freedom of expression, shielded from all forms of
prior censorship. To this dual end, the two Europes have
sought to adjust the liability of intermediary providers down-
wards, by prescribing the following two bans:
- firstly, a ban on establishing liability of intermediaries in
relation to information they transmit, host or store in
cached form, providing certain conditions are met42;
- secondly, a ban on imposing a general obligation on
intermediaries to monitor the information they transmit or
store, or a general obligation actively to seek facts or circum-
stances indicating illegal activity.43 Framed in absolute terms,
subject solely to the proviso contained in recital 47 (see below,
paragraphs 31 and 32), this provision is similarly addressed to
all national authorities: legislators, administrative authorities
and courts; it concerns both courts ruling on the merits and
those ruling on urgent applications.
This dual ban is not, however, an obstacle to the possibility,
for judicial or administrative authorities, of ordering
intermediaries to terminate or prevent an infringement
committed using their services.
The Directive on electronic commerce, in fact, states that
the rules on exemption of intermediary providers from
liability, subject to conditions, ‘shall not affect the possibility
for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with
Member States’ legal systems, of requiring the service
provider to terminate or prevent an infringement’.44 The
Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet
sets out a similar principle: ‘In all cases, the above-mentioned42 Articles 12 to 14 of Directive 2000/31 and the Declaration of 28
May 2003 on freedom of communication on the Internet, Principle
6. Cf. above, paragraph 16.
43 Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 and ibid.
44 Cf. Articles 12(3), 13(2) and 14(3), as well as recital 45, of the
Directive on electronic commerce.limitations of liability should not affect the possibility of
issuing injunctions where service providers are required to
terminate or prevent, to the extent possible, an infringement
of the law’.45
It should be noted that the decision to prescribe measures
intended to oblige intermediaries to prevent or terminate an
infringement is left to Member States: it is for national legal
orders to determine whether, and in what circumstances,
such measures may be undertaken. That said, Article 18(1) of
the Directive on electronic commerce establishes that
Member States must ensure ‘that court actions available
under national law concerning information society services’
activities allow for the rapid adoption of measures, including
interim measures, designed to terminate any alleged
infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the
interests involved’.
Subsequently, two European directives confirmed the
possibility of seeking interim measures against intermediaries
specifically in the field of enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
Directive 2001/29 states that ‘Member States shall ensure
that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third
party to infringe a copyright or related right’.46
Directive 2004/48, for its part, extends this possibility to all
intellectual property rights,47 stating that ‘Member States
shall also ensure that right holders are in a position to apply
for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are
used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right,
without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC’.48,49
This same Directive specifies, in Article 2, that it ‘shall not
affect (.) Directive 2000/31/EC, in general, and Articles 12 to
15 of Directive 2000/31/EC in particular’.infringe a copyright or related right (.)’. The text of the Benelux
Convention on Intellectual Property (Trade Marks and Designs)
has also been adapted to this same Directive. Article 2.2(6) of the
BCIP (new version) states that ‘The court may, at the request of
the holder of a trade mark, issue an injunction for cessation of
services against intermediaries whose services are used by a third
party to infringe its trade mark right’.
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courts imposing a general monitoring obligation on interme-
diary providers to be reconciled with the possibility granted to
them to issue an injunction against these same intermediaries
in cases where a third party uses their transmission or storage
services to infringe an intellectual property right?
There seems to be a need to explore the notion of a general
monitoring obligationmore deeply at a conceptual level (A) and
in the light - or, rather, through the chiaroscuro - of case-law (B)
inorder tobeable todefineprecisely thescopeof injunctions (C).53 P. Trudel, ‘La responsabilité des acteurs du commerce élec-
tronique’, in V. Gautrais, Droit du commerce électronique, Montreal,
publ. Thémis, 2002, pp. 607e649, specifically paragraphs 66 to 68,
commenting on the Canadian arrangements analogous to those
established by Articles 12 to 14 of the Directive on electronic
commerce.
54 Cf. the grounds relied on by the Commission to reject various
amendments proposed during preparatory work on Directive
2000/31 (Amended proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic
commerce in the Internal Market, 17 August 1999, COM(1999)427
final, p. 8), as well as the Report from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic3.1. Lack of a general monitoring obligation: what does
it mean?
In order properly to understand the scope of the ban on
imposing a generalmonitoring obligation on intermediaries, it
is important to define the outline of that obligation (1) before
distinguishing it from a specific monitoring obligation (2).
3.1.1. Outline of the general monitoring obligation
Benefit from exemptions from liability, introduced - subject
to conditions - for intermediary providers, would have been
reduced virtually to nil if they had not been supplemented by
the principle of a ban on any general monitoring obligation.
This is because, in the absence of such a principle, some
States could have been tempted to impose on intermediaries,
particularly host providers,50 a general obligation actively to
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activities. Case-
law confirms that such a temptation is not illusory, far from
it (see below, paragraph 2). Thus obliged to flush out
infringements committed using their services, intermediaries
would inevitably have practised prior censorship, including
where content was legitimate, through fear of being made
liable.51
It would not have made sense for the European legislator
to tolerate an intermediary removing information on the
basis of mere suspicion of its illegality or simple denuncia-
tion, without having first obtained confirmation of its illegal
nature from an independent third party. Such an approach,
difficult to reconcile with a respectful understanding of
freedom of expression and the public’s right to informa-
tion,52 would have damaged the basic principles of50 As these are able to escape all liability in cases where they are
not aware of facts or circumstances indicating illegal information
or an illegal activity, some Member States could have sought to
make them subject to an obligation actively to seek such facts or
circumstances, which would have reduced the benefit of Article
14. In this regard, E. Crabit, ‘La directive sur le commerce élec-
tronique. Le projet “Méditerranée”’, RDUE, Issue 4, 2000, p. 815.
51 Cf. the Declaration on freedom of communication on the
Internet of 28 May 2003, pp. 11 and 12 (see above, paragraph 16 in
fine).
52 Recitals 9 and 46 of Directive 2000/31 clearly establish that the
Directive is not meant to harm the fundamental principles of
freedom of expression. If it had been possible to make interme-
diary Internet providers subject to a general obligation to monitor
the information they transmit or store or a general obligation to
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity, this could
have ‘[had] the effect of curbing freedom of expression’ (Decla-
ration on freedom of communication on the Internet, commen-
tary on the sixth principle).a democratic society.53 These considerations reinforce the
fact, already clear, that no condition may be added to those
prescribed by Articles 12 e 14 of the Directive on electronic
commerce.54 They also confirm that the ban under Article 15
(1) concerns not just courts ruling on the merits but also
those ruling on urgent applications.
Moreover, without an explicit ban on imposing a general
monitoring obligation on intermediaries, there was a very real
risk of sliding towards objectivisation of their (civil) liability, so
great would the temptation have been for courts, in the pres-
ence of illegal information, to assume inadequate supervision
and, from this, to deduce fault on the part of the intermediary
under criticism. This attitude, in line with the trend in ideas on
civil liability, would have been the opposite of what was inten-
ded by the European legislator. This shows that the two bans
referred to above necessarily go hand in hand and aremutually
reinforcing.
3.1.2. What form of monitoring is covered?
By banning the imposition of a general monitoring obligation
on intermediary providers, the European legislator must have
had blocking and filtering software inmind. It must have been
clear to the legislator that a general monitoring obligation is
only possible using technical equipment in the digital
environment.55
This fact is established beyond doubt by the European
Commission’s First Report on Directive 2000/3156 and theand Social Committee of 21 November 2003 on the application of
Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, COM(2003)702
final, p. 14.
55 In this regard, F. Coppens, ‘Filtrage P2P: possibilités tech-
niques et obstacles juridiques’, RDTI, Issue 30, March 2008, p. 99;
E. Montero, ‘Chronique de jurisprudence en droit des technolo-
gies de l’information (2002e2008) - Droit du commerce électro-
nique’, RDTI, Issue 35, June 2009, p. 25. E. Crabit, who, as
a European Commission official, was a front-line participant in
drafting Directive 2003/31, writes this: ‘This ban covers all types
of general measures, even those that do not appear to be such but
would have the same effect. In particular, this ban would cover
measures requiring the host provider to undertake filtering of
information it hosts, as well as a general monitoring obligation in
a specific field, for example protection of minors’ (op. cit., p. 815.
Emphasis added.).
56 First Report from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee of
21 November 2003 on the application of Directive 2000/31 on
electronic commerce, COM(2003)702 final, p. 14.73
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Belgian law.57
The ban in question is justified not just by the reasons of
principle mentioned (safeguarding freedom of expression and
avoiding preventive censorship),58 but also on clear grounds of
a practical and economic nature: general monitoring would be
technically impractical and economically unsustainable.
As noted by the European Commission, ‘[this] is important,
as general monitoring of millions of sites and web pages
would, in practical terms, be impossible and would result in
disproportionate burdens on intermediaries and higher costs
of access to basic services for users’. ‘However’, it adds,
‘Article 15 does not prevent public authorities in the Member
States from imposing amonitoring obligation in a specific (.),
individual case’.59
The courts’ power of injunction against an intermediary
provider with a view to terminating or preventing an
infringement cannot lead to a general monitoring order. Thus,
any general filteringmeasure seems to be prohibited by Article
15(1) of theDirective.Atmost,national authoritiesmay impose
a specific monitoring obligation.
In this regard, the ambiguity of the expression ‘or prevent
an infringement’60 is to be deplored. It leads to the idea that the
Directive sanctions injunctions that consist in imposing an
obligation to supervise/monitor disseminated content on
a preventive basis. Given the risk of contradicting Article 15(1)
of the Directive, intermediaries’ preventive role may only be
conceived fairly narrowly.61 It is clear that imposing ameasure
obliging an intermediary, explicitly or implicitly, to filter all
content it transmits or stores so as to block supposedly illegal
content, even if this illegality had not been established57 Cf. draft Law on certain legal aspects of information society
services, preamble, Doc. parl., Ch. repr., sess. ord. 2002e2003, No
2100/1, p. 48. Also in this regard, P. Van Eecke, ‘De nieuwe wet-
geving inzake elektronische handel. Een eerste commentaar’, RW,
2003e2004, pp. 338-339.
58 A. Strowel, N. Ide and F. Verhoestraete, ‘La directive du 8 juin
2000 sur le commerce électronique : un cadre juridique pour
l’Internet’, JT, No 6000, 2001, p. 142, Issue 34; G.M. Riccio, La
responsabilità civile degli Internet providers, Giappichelli, Turin, 2002,
p. 70 (the author makes the pertinent observation that the
charges and costs created by a general monitoring obligation
would have the effect of keeping the Internet just for those
persons able to sustain them. As a result, what is at stake here is
the possibility of giving concrete form to the right to free
expression of thought and, more broadly, to its dissemination. In
other words, such an obligation, while bringing about an oligop-
olistic concentration of businesses, would lead to a senseless
situation: the right to freedom of expression would only exist de
facto where the means of exercising it were guaranteed).
59 First Report from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee of
21 November 2003 on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC on
electronic commerce, COM(2003)702 final, p. 14.
60 Articles 12(3), 13(2) and 14(3) of Directive 2000/31.
61 In this regard, E. Montero, ‘La responsabilité des prestataires
intermédiaires sur les réseaux’ in Le commerce électronique européen
sur les rails ? Analyse et propositions de mise en œuvre de la directive
sur le commerce électronique, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001, p. 284, No
532; G. Riccio, Profili di responsabilità civile dell’Internet Provider,
Salerno, 2000, p. 89.beforehand in accordance with Article 6 ECHR, would be
irreconcilable with the prohibition under Article 15(1).
How is recital 40 of Directive 2000/31 to be understood,
whereby: ‘(.) the provisions of this Directive relating to liability
should not preclude the development and effective operation,
by the different interested parties, of technical systems of
protection and identification and of technical surveillance
instruments made possible by digital technology within the
limits laid down by Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC’?
This recital means that the exemptions prescribed for
certain intermediary activities do not prevent providers from
carrying out voluntary checks, notably in a dual endeavour to
cooperate with the holders of intellectual property rights and
to preserve their brand image.62 In no case may a lack of such
systems place the intermediary at fault and establish its
liability. To assert the contrary would amount to considering,
implicitly but definitely, that it has a general monitoring obli-
gation, which is prohibited by Article 15 of Directive 2000/31. It
should be emphasised that no obligation of a general nature
may be imposed, even on the basis of a specific legal text.
It is also possible to question the scope of recital 48 of
Directive 2000/31, worded as follows: ‘This Directive does not
affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service
providers,whohost informationprovidedby recipientsof their
service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be
expected fromthemandwhichare specifiedbynational law, in
order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities’.
Does this text authorise national legislators to prescribe
supervisory obligations for host providers a priori? This recital
cannot be interpreted in a way that would ruin the general
organisation of the arrangements introduced by Articles 14 and
15 of the Directive. And so it must be considered, in particular,
that it cannot serve to establish a generalmonitoring obligation,
prohibited by Article 15(1).63 The ‘duties of care’ referred to in
recital 48 concern types of measures other than a general
monitoring obligation, such as an obligation to put in place
a structure for receiving complaints or systems for alerting and
notification of inappropriate or undesirable content (as exists,
moreover, on various second-generation websites), etc. In any
case, this must involve independent obligations, associated
with a specific sanction, unconnected to the question of the
intermediary’s liability with regard to content.64
But what is the possibility of imposing selective filtering
aimed at blocking specific content denounced as illegal?
In otherwords, is themonitoring obligation general as soon
as it involves a search of all content in order to block a single,
supposedly illegal, item, or is it only general if it concerns
monitoring all content in order to flush out every potentially
illegal item of content?65
This is the essence of the problem of interpretation.62 E. Montero, ibid., p. 279; C. Verdure, ‘Les hébergeurs de sites
web : victimes ou régulateurs de la société de l’information ?’,
DCCR, Issue 60, 2005, p. 41.
63 In this regard and for other considerations, E. Montero, ibid.,
pp. 289e292; A. Strowel, N. Ide and F. Verhoestraete, op. cit., p. 142,
Issue 37.
64 E. Crabit, op. cit., p. 815.
65 Such an alternative is well-expressed by R. Hardouin, ‘Obser-
vations sur les nouvelles obligations prétoriennes des héber-
geurs’, available at site www.juriscom.net.
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monitoring obligation
It should be noted, first of all, that the possibility granted to
the national authorities of imposing a specific monitoring
obligation on intermediaries cannot be regarded as an
exception to the principle of a ban on general monitoring
obligations.66 Such an analysis would amount to acknowl-
edging that a general monitoring obligation may be imposed
in some circumstances. That is not what is meant here. It is
worth drawing attention to the essentially dialectical nature
of law, in the sense that affirmation of a principle often goes
hand in hand with the formulation of other principles, which,
having their own field and justification, supplement the first
one, tempering its effects without, however, contradicting
them.67
The possibility of imposing a specificmonitoring obligation
must be seen as affirmation of such a corrective principle,
supplementing the principle of a ban on general monitoring
measures without contradicting it. In other words, imposition
of a general monitoring obligation does not seem to us to be
allowed, even for the purposes of detecting specific content,
within the possibility of imposing specific monitoring.
The fact remains that it is difficult, in practice, to make
a distinction between a general monitoring obligation and
a specific monitoring obligation. In this regard, the prepara-
tory work and the actual text of the Directive are not very
enlightening.
Atmost itmay be considered, in light of recital 47 and some
indications in the preparatory work for Directive 2000/31, that
the ban on imposing general monitoring does not concern the
monitoring obligations prescribed by a law applicable to
a specific circumstance. This brings to mind, in Belgian law,
Article 90b of the Code of Criminal Procedure: on this basis an
investigating judge could order an intermediary to monitor
a specific customer (‘electronic listening’68). In any case, only
monitoring that is ‘targeted’ (clearly specified site, content)
and ‘temporary’ is permissible, imposed at the request of
national judicial or police authorities in order to prevent or
tackle a specific illegal activity.693.2. Illustrations through a critical review of case-law
In order to illustrate our proposition, it seemsworth returning
to a few cases of particular significance, brought before courts
in France70 (1), Germany (2) and Belgium (3).66 Comp. R. Ardouin, ibid.
67 Cf. E. Bertrand, ‘Le rôle de la dialectique en droit positif privé’,
D, 1951, chron. XXXV, pp. 151e154.
68 This involves intercepting digital data during transmission.
69 Article-by-article commentary on the Directive on electronic
commerce, op. cit., p. 31: ‘This general rule does not exclude the
possibility of a court or the police asking a service provider to
supervise, for example, a specific site during a given period, in
order to prevent or tackle a specific illegal activity’. See also the
first draft of Article 15(1) in the Proposal for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic
commerce in the internal market, submitted by the Commission
on 18 November 1998, COM (1998), 586 final.
70 Some of these cases have been commented on by E. Montero,
‘Les responsabilités liées au Web 2.0’, op. cit., p. 383 et seq.3.2.1. French case-law
Among the abundant case-law an initial case appears of
interest for our proposition. Copies of the film ‘Joyeux Noël’ had
been discovered on Dailymotion, a video-sharing site. While
acknowledging that the site manager was a host provider, the
court seized of the case nevertheless considered the company
liable on the ground ‘that it must be seen as at least aware of facts
and circumstances suggesting that illegal videos were being put
online; that it therefore has to assume liability, being unable to put
the fault back onto the users alone, since it deliberately provided
them with the means to commit it’.71 Revealing a certain unease,
the Court continues: ‘whereas the law does not impose on technical
providers a general obligation to seek facts and circumstances indi-
cating illegal activities, this limitation does not apply when the said
activities are generated or brought about by the provider itself;
whereas it must be observed in the case in issue that the company
Dailymotion did not implement any appropriate means to make
access to the film ‘Joyeux Noël’ impossible (.), even though it was
incumbent on it to undertake a priori supervision’.
This judgment calls for a number of criticisms. Two
grounds for conviction are put forward in an incoherent way.
The arrangements for host providers concern ‘effective
knowledge of illegal activity or information’, i.e. of specific
content. The Court is wrong to consider that the provider loses
the benefit of the exemption from liability prescribed for
hosting activity from the time it becomes aware of the mere
possibility that illegal information may be put online on the
exchange site. It would have been a different thing - accept-
able in principle - to have considered the site owner at fault in
the design of the platform. However, it cannot be found at
fault within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code
purely on the ground that it puts a platform at the disposal of
Internet users, knowing that Internet users could download
illegal content there. Such an analysis would amount, in
practical terms, to condemning all content-sharing sites as
amatter of principle.72 Moreover, the supposed obligation of
a priori supervision, indicated by the Court, is open to criticism
on three counts: it makes the benefit of the prescribed
exemption for hosting subject to a condition that does not
figure in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31; it seems difficult to
reconcile it with Article 15(1) of the same Directive; it is to be
viewed with reserve in light of Article 10 ECHR.
By means of a carefully reasoned judgment of the Paris
Court of Appeal of 6 May 2009, this decision has fortunately
been altered in that the Court of Appeal found the company
Dailymotion liable for putting the disputed content online
since it had a priori knowledge of its illegal nature.73
Another judgment delivered in France, in the ‘Google
video’ case,merits criticism.74 In the case in issue, a document
produced by the company Zadig Productions had been
disseminated via Google video, without its authorisation.
When the producer notified Google of this dissemination,71 T.G.I. Paris [Paris Court of First Instance] (3rd ch.), 13 July 2007,
Nord Ouest Production v S.A. Dailymotion, cited above.
72 Comp. A. Saint Martin, op. cit., p. 38.
73 Paris (4th ch., A), 6 May 2009, Nord Ouest Production v S.A. Dai-
lymotion, www.legalis.net.
74 T.G.I. Paris (3rd ch.), 19 October 2007, Zadig Productions et al. v
Google Inc, Afa, www.legalis.net.
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put back online several times by various Internet users.
Advised of each new instance of dissemination, Google
systematically exercised due care in removing the film. Irri-
tated when it was put online for the umpteenth time, Zadig
decided to bring proceedings against Google video. The court
considered that Google was acting as host provider and not as
publisher. This status did not, however, prevent it from
remaining liable, on the ground that ‘informed of the illegal
nature of the content at issue bymeans of the first notification, it was
for it to implement all necessary means to avoid further dissemi-
nation’. The means in question probably refer to imple-
mentation of a filtering measure. This decision seems very
much open to criticism in that it makes the provider’s
exemption from liability for the hosting activity subject to
a condition not prescribed by the text of Article 14(1) of the
Directive.75 It must be acknowledged that it infringes not just
this provision but also Article 15(1) of the Directive and,
indeed, Article 10 ECHR. It was therefore wrong to have
retained Google’s liability on the basis that it had not under-
taken such supervision on its own initiative.
The following question also arises: in the context of an
action for interim measures, could a court have imposed
filtering aimed at avoiding further dissemination?Would such
a measure have been reconcilable with Article 15(1) of the
Directive?76 Insofar as the host providerwould not be required
to filter all stored content but solely that notified, it could, just
possibly, be maintained that this concerns a specific moni-
toring obligation. It would also be necessary for the moni-
toring imposed to be time-limited.77 All in all, if the order
involves filtering, on a temporary basis, of content that is
specific, clearly identified and held (on a provisional basis) to
be illegal, such a measure may seem legitimate in relation to
Directive 2000/31. Be that as it may, it is also necessary to
verify that it does not entail infringing Article 10 ECHR (see
below, paragraph C).
On the same groundswe also have reservations concerning
the judgment delivered in the case Flach Film v Google.78 After
having considered that, in operating the ‘Google video’ service,
the well-known search engine was acting in the capacity of
hostprovider, the courtnevertheless considered that company
to be liable on the basis of having committed acts of counter-
feiting in allowing, via various links, the film ‘The World
According to Bush’ to be downloaded or viewed via streaming.
This conviction took place notwithstanding the promptness
with which the links were removed as soon as their illegal
naturewasnotified, since thecourt considered thatGooglewas
under ‘a monitoring obligation, specific to an extent, once it
became aware of the illegal nature of the content’.
The court seems to have been more inspired in a case
relating to the online advertising platform ‘Vivastreet’.79 A
number of perfume companies had noted the dissemination75 Article 6.I.2 and 3 of Law No 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 on
confidence in the digital economy.
76 Article 6.I.7 of the Law on confidence in the digital economy.
77 Comp. R. Hardouin, ‘Observations sur les nouvelles obliga-
tions prétoriennes des hébergeurs’, cited above.
78 Comm. Paris, 20 February 2008, www.legalis.net.
79 Comm. Paris (ref.), two judgments, 26 July 2007 and 31 October
2007, Kenzo et al. v DMIS, www.legalis.net.viaVivastreetof advertisementsofferingsaleof their perfumes
outside the selective distribution network. By means of two
interimorders, the Paris Commercial Court ordered removal of
the disputed advertisements and the introduction, for a period
of six months, of an a priori filtering system enabling detection
and removal of advertisements relating to products of the
brands concerned. However, here too, the measure restricting
freedom of expression could come up against the triple test
arising from Article 10 ECHR and, more specifically, the pro-
portionality condition (see below, paragraph C).
3.2.2. German case-law
Counterfeit watches of the ‘Rolex’ brand had been put up for
auction on the marketplace sites ‘Ricardo.de’ and ‘eBay.de’.
By means of three successive judgments, the Bundesger-
ichshof considered that a host provider, aware of the illegal
nature of stored information, had a duty not just to remove it
but also to take reasonable filtering measures to prevent
future storage of information of that type. Otherwise, the host
provider was committing a fault making it liable in relation to
illegal information that could not have been accessed if ‘effi-
cient’ (?) filtering had been implemented.80
These judgments are clearly open to criticism in that the
benefit of exemption from liability introduced for the inter-
mediary in relation to stored information is not granted solely
under the heading and conditions of Article 14(1) of Directive
2000/31, but is made subject to compliance with a supple-
mentary condition, not prescribed by that text.
3.2.3. Belgian case-law
Belgian case-law is distinguished by two disastrous judg-
ments in a case pitting SABAM against the access provider
Tiscali (now Scarlet). Using Article 87(1) of the Law on copy-
right,81 SABAM, the Belgian copyright management company,
sought a judgment against Tiscali requiring it to terminate
copyright infringements concerning musical works in its
catalogue due to non-authorised exchange of musical files,
carried out using peer-to-peer (P2P) software via the access
provider’s services.
In an interlocutory judgment of 26 November 2004, the
Brussels Court of First Instance considered that Article 87(1)
indeed offered sufficient basis for a judgment ordering an
intermediary to terminate a copyright infringement, providing
this was specific, circumscribed and duly established. We,
however, take the contrary view that such a measure,
involving a general and permanent filtering obligation aimed
at neutralising peer-to-peer networks, contradicts the letter and
spirit of the Directive on electronic commerce. Thus we
regretted the fact that the court implicitly acknowledged that it
was legally possible to impose a general filtering obligation on
Tiscali, aimed at preventing future copyright infringements,
while we welcomed its decision to suspend its ruling until it80 BGH, 11 March 2004, Rolex v Ricardo (Case ‘Internet-Ver-
steigerung I’), I ZR 304/01, MMR, 2004, 668; BGH, 19 April 2007,
Rolex v eBay (Case ’Internet-Versteigerung II’), I ZR 35/04; BGH, 12
July 2007, IDV v eBay, I ZR 18/04.
81 Law of 30 June 1994 on copyright and related rights,MB, 27 July
1994, p. 19297.
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ness of the measures sought by SABAM.82
By means of a further judgment of 29 June 2007, the same
court ordered Scarlet to terminate the copyright infringe-
ments established in the judgment of 26 November 2004 by
rendering impossible all forms of exchange by its customers,
using P2P software, of files containing a musical work from
SABAM’s catalogue, on pain of a fine of EUR 2500 a day if
Scarlet did not comply with the judgment after expiry of
a time-limit of six months following its service.83
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by the expert
witness, the court found that technical measures were in fact
available toneutralise the copyright infringements established
on the network to which Scarlet provided access. Specifically,
these concerned digital fingerprinting technology developed
by the company Audible Magic.84 The court was wrong, in
particular, to reject the argument whereby the technical
measures sought would amount to imposing on Scarlet
a general monitoring obligation, prohibited by Article 15(1) of
the Directive on electronic commerce.85 This provision did not
rule out the use of filtering tools, in the court’s view, in light of
recital 40 of the Directive on electronic commerce. Moreover,
Article 15 was addressed solely to the court ruling on liability
and the injunction would not require Scarlet to ‘monitor’ its
network. However, as already suggested (see above, paragraph
28), the passage regarding technical surveillance instruments
cannot be arbitrarily isolated within recital 40, which, read as
a whole, undoubtedly refers to ‘voluntary agreements’
between all parties concerned. Moreover, since Article 15 is
expressed in absolute terms and without exception, it is
addressed to all national authorities, including courts hearing
interim applications (see above, paragraphs 20 and 25). Lastly,
it is undeniable that networkmonitoring is imposed on Scarlet
on the pretext that it operates using technical instruments:
how could it have been otherwise in the digital universe?
The case did not end there since, in the meantime, the
Brussels Court of First Instance, seized for the purpose of
interim measures, decided to cancel the fines payable by
Scarlet for the current period from January to 31 October
2008.86 Moreover, Scarlet appealed against the judgments
delivered on 26 November 2004 and 29 June 2007. The ninth
chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeal, called upon to rule82 See E. Montero and Y. Cool, ‘Le “peer-to-peer” en sursis ?’,
commentary on Civ. Brussels (cess.), 26 November 2004, RDTI,
Issue 21, 2005, pp. 97e106.
83 Civ. Brussels (cess.), 29 June 2007, AM, 2007/5, p.476, RDC, 2007/
7, p. 701, IRDI, 2007, p. 442, RDTI, Issue 30, 2008, p. 87, commentary
by F. Coppens.
84 This sophisticated technology forms part of the new genera-
tion of filtering tools: it aims to identify, among content hosted or
transmitted on a network, protected works, via their digital
representation and by comparison with the digital fingerprints of
content covered by intellectual property rights supplied by the
right holders and assembled in a vast data base; when content
matching a digital fingerprint found in the data base is identified
on the network or on a hosting site, that content is blocked.
85 Article 21 of the Belgian Law of 11 March 2003 on certain legal
aspects of information society services. For other reflections on
the judgment, see in particular the commentary by F. Coppens
cited in the footnote above.
86 Civ. (ref.) Brussels, 22 October 2008, unpublished.on this appeal, decided to refer two questions to the Court of
Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling.87 The
first was worded as follows: ‘Do Directives 2001/29 and 2004/
48, read in conjunction with Directives 95/46, 2000/31 and
2002/58, construed in particular in the light of Articles 8 and 10
ECHR, permit Member States to authorise a national court,
before which substantive proceedings have been brought and
on the basis merely of a statutory provision stating that: ‘They
[the national courts] may also issue an injunction against
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to
infringe a copyright or related right’, to order an Internet
Service Provider (ISP) to introduce, for all its customers, in
abstracto and as a preventive measure, exclusively at the cost
of that ISP and for an unlimited period, a system for filtering
all electronic communications, both incoming and outgoing,
passing via its services, in particular those involving the use of
peer-to-peer software, in order to identify on its network the
sharing of electronic files containing a musical, cinemato-
graphic or audio-visual work in respect of which the applicant
claims to hold rights, and subsequently to block the transfer of
such files, either at the point at which they are requested or at
which they are sent?’
The answers from the CJEU will clearly be of very great
interest for our proposition.
The judgment delivered on 31 July 2008 by the Brussels
Commercial Court in the case Lancôme v eBay is much more
satisfactory. Having noted the posting of illegal offers of sale
on the sitemanaged by eBay, Lancôme accused the well-known
auction site of failing to take effective measures to combat
counterfeiting of its perfumes and brought proceedings
against it. Adopting a ‘mixed classification’, consisting in
distinguishing the applicable liability arrangements according
to the nature of the disputed activity, the court found that
eBay benefited from the exemption from liability prescribed
under the heading and conditions of Article 14 of the Direc-
tive88 in relation to sales advertisements posted on its site by
third parties, while having to assume liability under ordinary
law with regard to the other services offered (which were not
criticised by Lancôme).
The court also specified, rightly, that, in accordance with
Article 15 of the Directive on electronic commerce (Article 21
of the Belgian Law), eBay does not have to assume ‘any obli-
gation to monitor the information it hosts, nor any general obligation
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.’ As
a result, Lancôme’s application, aimed at banning eBay from
allowing various types of advertisements to be posted on its
site, which would require monitoring that cannot be imposed
on it, was not allowed.89
To see the principles correctly applied, reference may also
be made to an exemplary judgment of the Antwerp Court of
Appeal of 20 December 2006, an extract from which is worth87 Brussels (9th ch.), 28 January 2010, unpublished, RG 2007/AR/
2424.
88 Article 20 of the Belgian Law of 11 March 2003 on certain legal
aspects of information society services.
89 For other comments, see E. Montero, ‘Sites de vente aux
enchères et offres de vente illicites’, commentary on Comm.
Brussels (7th ch.), 31 July 2008, RDTI, Issue 33, 2008, pp. 528-533,
and C. De Preter, ‘Une salutation au jugement Lancôme/eBay, la
visière levée’, IRDI, 2008, pp. 253e255.
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a monitoring obligation that is impractical and contrary to the letter
of the Law on electronic commerce. A supplier of Internet services
cannot be required actively to seek facts and circumstances indi-
cating illegal activity. The measures ordered by the court may in no
circumstance have the effect that publication, dissemination or
issuing of an opinion, by whatever means of communication, is
obstructed or made subject to conditions. The measure may therefore
only consist of removing the columns [.] that are the subject of these
proceedings. There may be no question of obstructing future publi-
cation of other columns that could harm reputation and honour,
which would constitute prior censorship’90.92 In this regard, S. Dusollier, ‘Tribune libre - Responsabilités des
intermédiaires de l’Internet: un équilibre compromis ?’, RDTI,
Issue 29, 2007, pp. 269e272.
93 Cf. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Prendre l’idée simple au
sérieux, Brussels, Bruylant, 2001, specifically pp. 31e38, and the
numerous references; F. OST and M. Van De Kerchove, De la3.3. What type of injunction may be issued against
intermediaries?
What is the scope of Article 11 of the Directive on intellectual
property rights, given that it does not seek to affect Directive
2000/31, which, as has been seen, enshrines the possibility for
a court to require an intermediary to terminate or prevent an
infringement (Articles 12(3), 13(2) and 14(3)), while at the same
time banning the court from imposing on it a monitoring obli-
gation of a general nature (Article 15(1))? It is now time to capi-
talise on the lessons drawn from the theory and case-law
expounded (see above, points A and B) in order to assess the
scope of injunctions liable to be issued against an intermediary
whoseservicesareusedto infringean intellectualproperty right
(trade mark right, copyright or related right, etc.).
It only seems possible to envisage a form of injunction that
involves specific acts of removal, blocking or filtering relating
to an infringement, or risk of infringement,which is identified,
clearly circumscribed and duly established. Such will be the
case, for example, in situations where a site contains coun-
terfeitedworks, particularly if it is hostedanonymously:where
the owner of the disputed site cannot be identified, the inter-
mediary may be instructed to remove the counterfeit content.
A host provider could also be ordered to cease storing an illegal
site or access providers to implement all appropriatemeasures
to prevent access to the disputed site fromnational territory.91
On the other hand, where it involves permanent security or
filtering measures, an injunction aimed at banning a type of
infringement (such as hosting offers of counterfeit products of
a particular brand, blocking illegal exchange of music files,
etc.) would contradict not just the principle of prohibiting any
general monitoring obligation but also the fundamental
principles concerning freedom of expression, which includes
freedom to receive and impart information - without censor-
ship (Article 10 ECHR). In fact, as illustrated by a number of
cases referred to above, given that all types of infringements
would, sooner or later, be committed via the services of any
sizeable carrier or host provider, injunctions aimed at banning
each type of infringement are likely to multiply. And yet, the
spirit and letter of the Directive on electronic commerce90 Antwerp, 20 December 2006, AM, 2008, p. 138.
91 For an illustration see Cass. fr. (1st civ. ch.), 19 June 2008,
unpublished, dismissing the appeal entered against the judgment
delivered on 24 November 2006 by the Paris Court of Appeal (14th
ch., B) in the aaargh case, taken from the name of a negationist
site.clearly rule out the possibility of filtering imposed on an
intermediary, intended to detect all supposedly infringing
content, becoming an instrument in the general fight against
infringement of intellectual property rights.92
In fact, imposition of a filtering measure is highly likely to
infringe the right to freedom of expression. For interference in
this right to be permissible in light of the European Conven-
tion, it must be prescribed by law, pursue one of the legitimate
objectives restrictively listed in Article 10(2) of the Convention
and meet a proportionality requirement.
It is difficult to arguewith the fact that European legislation
provides for the possibility of an injunction. Even so, it could be
argued that the possibility of filtering does not emerge clearly
fromacombined readingof thevarious texts and that case-law
is not very clear on this question. Are intermediaries thus in
a position to predict, with a sufficient degree of certainty, the
consequences that might result from behaving in a particular
way (see above, paragraph 11)? Even by surrounding them-
selves with enlightened advice, Internet intermediaries do not
seem to be in a position to predict, to a reasonable degree, that
a filtering measure, even limited to specific content, may be
imposed on them.
What, then, of the two other conditions of legitimacy and
proportionality?
The legitimate objective of protecting the rights of others
appears in the secondparagraph ofArticle 10.What ismore, as
has been seen, the Court recently acknowledged that intel-
lectual property rights fall within the scope of Article 1 of the
First Additional Protocol to the Convention,which protects the
right to property.
The third condition, ‘proportionality’, therefore remains.
Implementation of this condition cannot give rise to an
assessment that is guided solely by intuition or common sense
and, consequently, that is eminently subjective. In light of the
pioneering role played by German administrative case-law, it
may be considered that conformity with the proportionality
criterion assumes, more specifically, that three conditions are
met93: themeasure restricting freedommust be appropriate, i.e.
such as to protect effectively the legitimate interest harmed by
exercise of this freedom94; it must also be necessary, in the
sense that, among thevariousmeanssuitable for achieving the
pursued objective, the measure chosen is the one least
damaging to the rights involved; lastly, it must satisfy the test
of proportionality stricto sensu, i.e. there is still a need to
demonstrate that the restricted freedomdoesnotoutweigh the
legitimate interest to be safeguarded or, in other words, thatpyramide au réseau. Pour une théorie dialectique du droit, Brussels,
Publications des F.U.S.L., 2002, p. 440 and the reference to H.
Maurer, Droit administratif allemand, translated by M. Fromont,
Paris, LGDJ, 1995, p. 272.
94 The measure will be judged inappropriate if it is shown that,
on the date it was taken, it was bound to fail in normal circum-
stances. Cf. S. Van Drooghenbroeck, op. cit., p. 35, No 31.
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concerned by the measure is not excessive in relation to the
benefit it produces elsewhere. This balancing of conflicting
freedomsor interestsmust takeplacenot in the abstract, given
that no interest protected by the Convention has absolute
priority over the others, but according to the circumstances of
each particular case.
Are the filtering measures imposed on intermediaries
proportionate to the objective of protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights?
As things stand, two observations are called for.
Firstly, filtering measures, even limited to specific content,
do not seem suitable for effectively guaranteeing the antici-
pated result.95 Ill-intentioned Internet users have more than
one string to their bow and redouble their imaginative efforts
to design circumvention strategies. It is thus common for
a site’s closure for infringing intellectual property rights of
a third party to lead to the illegal activities transferring to
another address. One way or another, is there not a risk of
seeing the same illegal content endlessly returning to the
Web? Filtering measures, far from being a panacea, would
then only offer a brief respite.
Secondly, given the current state of the technology, most
filters do not seem suitable for determining whether a commu-
nication is authorised or infringes intellectual property rights.96
As a result, filtering measures, even limited to specific
content, will practically always be ‘over-inclusive’ or ‘under-
inclusive’97: they inevitably risk either leading to removal or
blocking of content that in no way infringes intellectual
property rights (this brings to mind communications justified
by an exception to copyright, such as parody, or by a licence),
or letting illegal communications through.
Imposition of filtering, even if limited, is very likely to be
a measure disproportionate to the objective of protecting the
rights of holders of intellectual property rights.
The current trend towards voluntary filtering,98 notably on
the basis of negotiated compromises between Internet
intermediaries and right holders or their representatives, also
calls for some reservations with regard to preserving the right
to freedom of expression.
Of course, this in no way involves a State body imposing
a filtering measure. It is however always under their positive95 Cf., among other studies, C. Callanan, M. Gercke, E. De Marco,
H. Dries-Ziekenheiner, “Internet blocking balancing cybercrime
responses in democratic societies”, 2009, www.aconite.com/
blocking/study; M. Jayasuriya, J. Pearlman, R. Topolski, M. Wein-
berg, S. Siy, ‘Forcing the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright
Filtering is Not a Viable Solution for U.S. ISPs’, 2009, www.
PublicKnowledge.org.
96 It is true that recital 59 of Directive 2001/29, cited above,
requires States to provide for the possibility of applying for an
injunction ‘even where the acts carried out by the intermediary
are exempted under Article 50. Nevertheless, it may be thought
that this simply concerns the obligation to organise a right of
appeal in favour of the holder of a copyright, enabling that person
to allege infringement of his or her rights before a court without
prejudice to the opposing party asserting an exception to
copyright.
97 M. Jayasuriya, J. Pearlman, R. Topolski, M. Weinberg, S. Siy, op.
cit., specifically p. 47 and p. 49.
98 See C. Angelopoulos, op. cit., pp. 9e10.obligations (see above, paragraph 10), and pursuant to the
theory of ‘dissuasive effect’,99 that States should, to comply
fully with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, ensure that they do not place intermediaries under
such fear of liability claims that they come to impose on
themselves filtering that is appropriate for making them
immune to any subsequent accusation but is of a kind that
threatens the freedom of expression of Internet users.4. Conclusion
It is remarkable to note the extent to which the European
Union and the Council of Europe are in agreement in consid-
ering that safeguarding and promoting freedomof expression,
including the freedom to receive and impart information
itself, demand both:
- a limit on the liability of information society intermediaries
in the wording and the conditions of Articles 12 to 14 of the
Directive on electronic commerce;
- a ban on imposing a general monitoring obligation on these
same intermediaries.
In other words, the exemptions from liability and the
banning rule referred to above arise from correct application
of Article 10 ECHR, read in parallel with the various texts
adopted within the framework of the Council of Europe. It is
therefore in light of these principles and of the said Article 10
that the well-founded nature and the scope of injunctions
liable to be issued against intermediary providers should be
assessed. Indeed, the case-law developed by the Strasbourg
Court around Article 10 shows that:
- this provision covers all types of information, including
information of a commercial nature, and concerns not
just the content of the information but also the means
of transmission and reception (insofar as any restric-
tion on these erodes the right to receive and impart
information);
- exercise of freedom of expression, in its various forms,
may only be made subject to certain conditions, restric-
tions or sanctions, necessary in a democratic society, if
these are (1) prescribed by law, (2) justified by a pressing
social need, and (3) proportionate to the goal legitimately
pursued.
As has been seen, it is around the third condition, pro-
portionality, that a delicate trade-off takes place between the
right to freedom of expression and intellectual property
rights.
In theory, the various texts of the European legal order
show that a competent national authority of a Member State
that has transposed Directive 2004/48 could, on establishing99 See, in general terms, K. Lemmens, ‘Se taire par peur : l’effet
dissuasif de la responsabilité civile sur la liberté d’expression’,
A&M, 2005, pp. 32e40.
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information infringing an intellectual property right, issue an
injunction against that intermediary, provided that the
measures ordered only involve acts of monitoring, removal,
disabling of access or filtering that relate to specific and clearly
identifiable content, held to be illegal under an interim or final
judgment made by a competent national authority and open
to appeal before an impartial court or regulating body in
accordance with Article 6 ECHR.
As things stand, despite technological progress and the
emergence of software that is increasingly precise and ever
better controlled in terms of its effects, implementation of
a filteringmeasure appears difficult to reconcile with the rightto freedom of expression. How do we do enough without
doing too much?
The question arises: does there really exist, at present,
a technological possibility of filtering, directed towards
specific and clearly identifiable content, that is both effective,
i.e. such as to prevent recurring infringement of an intellec-
tual property right, and appropriate for enabling the right to
freedom of expression on the Net?
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